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 This research study addresses the epistemological shortcomings of prevailing 
Political Economy theory as it relates to core assumptions about free trade and their 
implications for managing the economic risks that arise from capital and labor re-
allocations.  This study will examine the two most significant U.S. trade decisions after 
the Cold War, the multilateral trade negotiations of 1995 known as the Uruguay Round, 
and the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) agreement with China in 2000, and 
their potential impacts on the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis.   
 This research study will use statistical methods, specifically regression analysis, 
to capitalize on existing quantitative economic data and to make empirically supported 
inferences about any relationship between trade liberalization and financial crisis.  
Furthermore, this methodology lends itself well to operationalizing the concept of risk.  
 This study finds that the Uruguay Round and the PNTR likely contributed to a 
U.S. trade deficit that was already growing prior to the 2008 crisis.  The trajectory of this 
trade deficit exhibits a strong linear relationship with the movement of U.S. housing 
prices during the same period.  This study concludes that U.S. trade liberalization during 
the period considered was akin to an antecedent condition in which foreign states, driven 
by relative gains concerns, transferred financial risk onto the United States at a time when 
domestic factors were simultaneously driving the formation of a national housing bubble.   
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 After the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States stood alone 
as the world’s economic and military superpower.  With the national security threat of 
communism fading into the background, the predominant focus for U.S. policy makers 
began to shift toward economic issues that had previously been given secondary 
consideration.   
 In July 1990, the U.S. experienced a mild recession that lasted until March 1991 
and dispelled a long period of optimism in the labor market.  Previously robust white-
collar sectors like finance and real estate suffered net job loss for the first time since 
World War II.1  As a result, these economic issues gained salience in the 1992 
presidential election.  Democratic Party nominee Bill Clinton roundly criticized 
incumbent George H.W. Bush for the recession and eventually defeated him.   
 Speaking to the Senate Finance Committee in March 1993, President Clinton’s 
new U.S. trade representative Mickey Kantor argued that economic issues, which had 
previously been given short shrift in favor of national defense concerns during the Cold 
War, were now a critical priority.  Kantor argued further that expanded and open trade 
was a necessary precondition for increased economic growth.2  International sentiment 
also reflected Kantor’s concerns.  Many other states realized that they too could no longer 
afford to ignore economic issues now that the common threat of the Soviet Union had 
dissolved.3   
 
1 Jennifer M. Gardner, "The 1990-91 Recession: How Bad Was the Labor Market?" Monthly Labor Review 
117, no. 6 (1994): 10-11.  
2 Mickey Kantor, “US Trade Policy and the Post-Cold War World,” 1993, U.S. Department of State Dispatch 
4 no. 11: 143 
3 C. Fred Bergsten 1992, “The World Economy After the Cold War,” California Management Review 34, no. 
2 (1992): 54, doi:10.2307/41166693. 
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 In part, this advocacy for expanded trade hinted at a larger paradigm shift in U.S. 
economic policy following the end of the Cold War.  Speaking to the Eastern Economic 
Association in 2004, Ben Bernanke argued that:  
“One of the most striking features of the economic landscape over the past twenty years 
or so has been a substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility…The increased depth 
and sophistication of financial markets, deregulation in many industries, the shift away 
from manufacturing toward services, and increased openness to trade and international 
capital flows are other examples of structural changes that may have increased 
macroeconomic flexibility and stability.”4 
 
In his speech, Bernanke is referring to what is now known as The Great Moderation.  The 
Great Moderation is a period of time that coincides with the tenure of Alan Greenspan as 
the Chair of the Federal Reserve between 1987 and 2006.  During this timeframe, the 
prevailing narrative was that, in Bernanke’s view, the chaotic nature of markets had been 
reduced because of three factors: structural changes, smarter policy, and good luck.5  As a 
result, it was believed that these factors would help provide the stability that was required 
for sustained economic growth.  Of course, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis directly 
challenged this narrative of control.  Volatility had been gradually building in the U.S. 
housing sector for years, which served as the catalyst for the crisis.    
 The purpose of this research study is to examine the policy aspect of The Great 
Moderation, namely trade liberalization, and its relationship to the 2008 crisis.  
Therefore, the research question can be stated as: what effect, if any, did trade 
liberalization after the Cold War have in the formation of the 2008 global financial crisis?  
 A key component of this analysis is to examine how the faulty expectations of 
The Great Moderation, with regard to managing volatility, may have created an opposite 
 
4 Ben Bernanke, "Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke" (speech, Washington, DC, Feb 20, 2004), The 
Federal Reserve Board, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/ 
5 Ibid.  
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effect thanks to the removal of international trade barriers.  For the purposes of this 
research study, volatility refers to the degree of variation in a random variable that is 
relative to its mean.  A variable with high volatility carries both extreme upside and 
downside, or benefit and harm, respectively.  In markets, volatile phenomenon like stocks 
are inherently risky.  Risk in this study means exposure to loss or injury.  Risk can, under 
certain conditions, be operationalized as a pure gamble that is a function of both 
probability and consequence, such as the outcomes generated by a series of fair coin flips.  
By using this framework of volatility and risk, this study identifies some epistemological 
problems about free trade that arise in the Political Economy literature.  By incorporating 
these perspectives, this study encourages a richer discourse about the relationship 
between a state’s trade decisions and its economic security in a dynamic world 
characterized by unpredictable outcomes.  
 Accordingly, the bulk of data analysis will rely on quantitative methodology to 
answer the research question.  In particular, regression analysis will be used as the 
primary treatment method for identifying any potential relationship between trade 
liberalization and the 2008 crisis.  Furthermore, this study capitalizes on the availability 
of U.S. government data that aims to capture the aggregate behavior of markets.   
Background 
 Given the new economic mandate after the Cold War, both the Bush and Clinton 
administrations began to look at policy options that could address the cloudy economic 
outlook brought on by the 1990-1991 recession.  Consistent with Kantor’s observation, 
expanded trade was an appealing option, especially free trade agreements (FTAs).  
Between 1994 and 2000, the United States government passed three major free trade 
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deals, among other smaller deals in the 2000s, that helped to further integrate the U.S. 
into the global economy.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came 
into force on January 1, 1994 which reduced regional trade barriers and lowered 
transaction costs between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.  One year later, President Bill 
Clinton signed the executive order that officially cemented U.S. involvement in the newly 
established World Trade Organization (WTO) after Congressional ratification.  Finally, 
in 2000, the U.S. passed a “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” (PNTR) agreement with 
China that acceded it to the WTO, thus giving the world greater access to the large 
Chinese market and vice versa.6  
 However, each of these major FTAs were met with significant domestic political 
resistance that carried over into the 2000s.  A common critique of free trade is that it 
often encourages capital to go where it can gain the highest return, which includes 
overseas investment at the expense of domestic projects.  And wherever capital goes, 
labor tends to follow.  Indeed, this was a principal complaint among U.S. labor unions 
like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–
CIO) who believed that FTAs like NAFTA would encourage U.S. manufacturing firms to 
move production to countries like Mexico where the cost of labor was much cheaper.7   
 Although the net effect of these deals on the U.S. labor market is disputed and 
often muddled in retrospect, what is clear is that they removed costly trade barriers while 
also diminishing the political power of interest groups who advocated for protection 
against foreign competition.  These trade deals therefore paved the way for a large re-
 
6 Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2017), pp. 633-671 
7 Ibid, pp. 634-636 
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allocation of economic resources in both the U.S. and international economies.  For 
example, according to one estimate, NAFTA alone was responsible for a 23.16% increase 
in trade flows between the U.S. and Mexico while simultaneously contracting U.S. trade 
with the rest of the world by -0.40%.8   
 For the purposes of this study, however, NAFTA is assumed to have a minimal 
impact on the formation of the 2008 crisis.  Consistent with the findings of previous 
research, this perspective arises from the presence of confounding factors, like the 
Mexican currency crisis that began several months after NAFTA’s passage in January 
1994.9         
 In the wake of these new FTAs, the U.S. trade deficit began to grow rapidly.  
Between January 1992 and 2007, the trade balance deficit of the United States ballooned 
by 2,255%, peaking at more than -$65 billion in Q3 2006.10  Given the nature of balance 
of payments accounting, trade deficits (surplus) are viewed as synonymous with excess 
investment (saving) because of financing concerns.  In this context, it is important to note 
that previous research has found some portion of foreign investment during this period 
ended up in the U.S. housing market.  The literature identifies these foreign flows as one 
of many contributing factors to the development of the housing bubble in the mid-2000s, 
the bursting of which catalyzed the 2008 global financial crisis.11  The effect from the 
U.S. trade deficit, however, pales in comparison to the effect of contemporaneous 
 
8 John Romalis, "NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on International Trade," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 89 no. 3 (2007): 429. 
9 Ibid, pp. 416 
10 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau, Trade Balance: Goods and Services, Balance 
of Payments Basis, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, June 5, 2020, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOPGSTB 
11 Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 199 
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mortgage-backed security trading.  In both 2007 and 2008, the annual trade volume in 
this market reached approximately $80 trillion.  Previous research has found that this 
speculative trading was fueled and exacerbated by previous financial de-regulation and 
the behavior of U.S. investment banks who maintained exorbitant debt at the outset of the 
crisis.12   
 However, the 2008 crisis was not the first of its kind since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.  As mentioned previously, Mexico suffered from a currency crisis in 1994.  In 
1997, Thailand’s currency also collapsed and spread the contagion to adjacent Asian 
countries.  In 1998, the Russian government began defaulting on its debt.13  Despite the 
previous research about institutional malfeasance that preceded the 2008 crisis, it is also 
curious why, following a period of U.S. trade liberalization, the world began to 
experience a series of unexpected economic crises.  For example, the odds of the total 
financial damage during August of the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis, according to 
orthodox financial analysis, were 1 in 500 billion.  That is, an event occurring 
approximately only once every 1.37 billion years.  We now know thanks to hindsight that 
orthodox financial theory grossly underestimated the odds of such events.14   
 In contrast to the economic crises that occurred after 1992, previous crises 
differed in two critical ways.  First, previous crises, such as the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, and the 1980s 
Foreign Debt Crisis, were often the consequence of particular government decisions 
 
12 Nate Silver, The Signal and The Noise (New York: Penguin Books, 2015), pp. 35 
13 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
6th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 285-286 
14 Benoit B. Mandelbrot and Richard L Hudson. The (mis)behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, 
and Reward (New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 3-7 
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rather than a systemic market failure that the 2008 crisis typified.  In the case of the oil 
shocks, OPEC countries intervened in the oil market by contracting supplies to raise 
prices and by circulating petrodollar reserves into the international banking system, 
which ended up being recycled into countries like Mexico and negatively impacted their 
ability to service their debt.15  The debt crisis of the 1980s was partly a consequence of 
the preceding OPEC shocks and partly a consequence of economically-developing state 
officials who took out large loans from private banks in countries like the United States 
to avoid the stricter conditional loans that were issued by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  Consequently, the absence of conditionality meant that a borrowing state’s 
officials were free to make mistakes, such as investing in non-productive projects that led 
to waste and corruption.16  To avoid the onset of a broader financial contagion, the 
primary remedy in this case was to rely on the IMF to serve as the intermediary in 
restructuring borrower’s repayment schedules with their creditors.17 
 A second difference between earlier and later crises is the scale of the damage.  
An upper-range estimate of the damage caused by the 1980s debt crisis is nearly $500 
billion.18  In the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis, which began in 1986, it ended up costing 
approximately $160.1 billion in direct and indirect costs between the years of 1989 and 
1995, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office.19  In comparison, the 
2008 global financial crisis resulted in approximately $19.2 trillion (2011 dollars) in lost 
 
15 Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, pp. 174-175 
16 Ibid, pp. 175-176 
17 Ibid, pp. 185-186 
18 Manuel Pastor, Jr., “Latin America, the Debt Crisis, and the International Monetary Fund,” Latin 
American Perspectives 16, no. 1 (1989): 79. 
19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Financial Audit: Resolution Trust Corporation’s 1995 and 1994 




U.S. household wealth.20  After he served as the Chair of the Federal Reserve, Ben 
Bernanke testified in a U.S. Court of Federal Claims case that the 2008 crisis was the 
worst crisis for the U.S. since the Great Depression.  He also testified that the damage 
was so widespread that it compromised the solvency of 12 of the 13 most important U.S. 
financial institutions, like Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. which ultimately failed.21  
Since the U.S. dollar is the global reserve currency and U.S. Treasury Bills are 
considered to be the safest investment vehicle in the global economy, the scale and scope 
of the 2008 crisis is very likely more consequential than the crises that came before it.  
Literature Review 
 The two dominant perspectives in Political Economy are liberalism and 
neomercantilism, which are discussed below.  Liberalism, espoused by U.S. officials like 
Mickey Kantor, provides good explanatory fit for the motivations and behavior of the 
United States following the end of the Cold War.  In contrast, neomercantilism helps to 
explain some of the actions of U.S. trading partners like China during the same period.  
Additionally, a thorough examination of each school’s epistemology will aid the reader in 
understanding where opportunities for risk management arise and how risk can be shifted 
during the course of trade relationships between nations.   
Perspectives on Trade 
 In the literature of Political Economy, trade tends to be a contentious issue 
because much of the debate is couched in dichotomous terms such as positive vs. zero 
 
20 U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Financial Crisis Response in Charts, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2012, pp. 2, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/Documents/20120413_FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf 




sum, absolute vs. relative gains, and cost vs. benefit that each school uses to convey the 
implications of theory.  In keeping with the framework established by Theodore Cohn 
(2016), the two predominant schools of thought that this research study will reference are 
economic liberals and neomercantilists.  Although critical theories like constructivism 
and historic materialism are also represented in the Political Economy literature through 
concepts like Dependency Theory, these critical perspectives generally do not share a 
common set of theoretical assumptions.  Furthermore, critical perspectives often place 
smaller states, like those of South America, at the center of analysis.22  Thus, it becomes 
difficult to use critical theory to draw valid inferences about the trade decisions of a 
highly developed liberal nation like the United States.  However, some critical 
perspectives will be mentioned where appropriate.   
 Distinct from political liberals, economic liberals trace their ideological lineage to 
Adam Smith whose magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations (1776) argued, in part, that a 
market system that was free to trade was the best way to increase a nation’s overall 
prosperity.  In this context, the word “free” most nearly means the absence of arbitrary 
state intervention in markets.  Smith’s ideas contravened contemporary ones who 
generally believed that the economy should be subordinated to state control to advance its 
interests.23  Flowing from the free trade premise of Adam Smith, today’s liberals still 
believe that individual entities like people and firms should be the central actor in 
economics because these individuals possess the most direct knowledge about how 
market transactions will affect them.  That is, third parties like government officials 
 
22 Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy, pp. 103-122 
23 Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic 
Thinkers 7th ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp. 53-57 
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cannot be expected to know what the optimal outcomes are for the vast array of buyers 
and sellers.  Furthermore, individuals are assumed to be rational actors in which each 
seeks to maximize his or her own self-interest.  
 Finally, modern economic liberals since World War II have advocated for an 
international order that relies on institutions like the WTO and the IMF to maintain a 
common set of rules and norms for member countries so that decision and information 
costs are kept to a minimum.24  In doing so, it is believed that lower costs in general 
encourage a higher velocity of trade which, in turn, increases the overall level of 
subsequent economic benefit.  In this context, liberals tend to frame trade as a positive-
sum exchange that grows the size of the economic pie being shared.  When evaluating 
choices about trade with another nation, liberals argue that it is preferable to weigh 
alternatives based on the total or absolute gains that accrue to the state.25  Liberals also 
argue that comparing gains to that of a trading partner is a moot point because the pie is 
expected to grow anyway.   
In general terms then, liberals believe that the state is uniquely positioned, with 
regard to matters of trade, to negotiate for and enforce common rules and norms with 
other nations on behalf of its constituents.  However, liberals will also assert that the state 
may intervene in its own economy in times of emergency like recessions, pandemics, or 
wars in order to swiftly reallocate resources toward a common objective that helps the 
state survive.26  Logically then, the implicit assumption of this view is that state leaders 
bear a great responsibility in addressing the sources of extreme, systemic risks that affect 
 
24 Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy, pp. 78-79 
25 Ibid, pp. 55-56 
26 Bruce Caldwell in F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents: The Definitive Edition, (New 
York: Routledge, 2008), pp.32 
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the entire nation simultaneously.  Trade, therefore, must be accounted for in this 
responsibility.  
 Consistent with realism in International Relations, neomercantilists view the 
international system as anarchic in which there is no centralized authority over the 
myriad of individual states.  Although liberals also share this originating assumption, they 
draw much different conclusions about its implications.  In contrast to liberals, state 
leaders in the neomercantilist view are encouraged to pursue opportunities that maximize 
state power to fend off predations from other states, often at the expense of individual 
actors.  Neomercantilists therefore believe that the nation state must be the central actor 
in economic affairs.  However, most neomercantilists share part of the liberal view that 
economic actors behave rationally and that free markets are best suited for generating 
wealth and influence, insofar as market activity improves the power and well-being of the 
state.27   
 Moreover, neomercantilists are more conscious about how costs and benefits from 
trade are distributed.  Given an anarchic international system and the imperative of state 
interests, neomercantilists see little reason to believe that international institutions like the 
WTO have either the power or the willingness to fairly manage the competing interests of 
various actors.  Rather, these institutions are viewed as arenas in which states vie for 
power.28  Consequently, this continuous struggle to manage the balance of power 
between states generally leads neomercantilists to view economic relations in zero-sum 
 
27 Jonathan Kirshner, ‘Realist Political Economy: Traditional Themes and Contemporary Challenges’ in 
Mark Blyth, Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE As a Global Conversation 
(London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 36-47 
28 John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 
(1994): pp. 7, doi:10.2307/2539078. 
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terms in which trade is only viewed as beneficial if it creates a favorable distribution of 
gains, relative to that of a trading partner.   
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. pursued a path of trade liberalization 
that was premised on the idea that free trade was the policy most likely to generate a 
Pareto improvement for all stakeholders.  In plain terms, a Pareto improvement occurs 
whenever at least one person is made better off without injuring anyone else in situations 
where resources like capital or labor are re-allocated.  Flowing from this assumption, 
however, is a technical corollary: if free trade is the vehicle best suited for delivering a 
Pareto improvement in which no one is injured by trade decisions, then we should expect 
that, on average, free trade has little to no relationship to economic crises, a phenomenon 
which causes extreme, systemic harm.   
 Liberals derive this Pareto-improving assumption from the concept of 
comparative advantage, which was formalized by David Ricardo in 1817.  Ricardo 
extended Adam Smith’s concept of absolute advantage which asserts that states should 
specialize in those goods and services that they produce more efficiently than other states 
and then engage in trade for mutual benefit.  Comparative advantage goes one step 
farther than absolute advantage by arguing that:  
“…if someone happens to be the best doctor in town and, at the same time, 
the best secretary, then it  would be preferable to be the higher-earning 
doctor-as it would minimize opportunity losses-and let someone else be the 
secretary and buy services from him.”29  
 
In other words, even if a state has an absolute advantage in the production of all goods 
and services, the pursuit of economic independence, known as autarky, is not maximally 
 




productive because a state’s most inefficient sector will invariably waste resources like 
labor productivity in comparison to its stronger sectors.  Therefore, all states are 
encouraged to forego autarky in favor of some form of specialization and then participate 
in trade with other countries.  However, the critical limitation of Ricardo’s argument, and 
liberals by extension, is that it is a deterministic model.   This means that it is stripped of 
randomness like price variations, and thus tacitly assumes that there is no risk for 
engaging in trade.  Obviously, under real-world conditions this is an unreasonable 
assumption.   
 Neomercantilists and critical theorists argue further that Ricardo’s model is too 
narrow in scope.  Some of these critiques include Ricardo’s use of labor as the only input 
and for assuming that trade is balanced, where total exports and imports are equal in 
value.  In short, critics contend that comparative advantage overlooks the intractable 
disparities, like differences in the cost of labor, between developed and under-developed 
nations and can therefore lead to skewed outcomes depending on the particular 
advantages each state possesses.30  Liberal responses to these arguments are quick to 
point out that although there are inherent differences between states, protectionist 
measures that are designed to correct imbalances, like tariffs, fundamentally do not 
address the scaling property of opportunity costs that specialization alleviates.  Thus, 
liberals argue that free trade has a greater utility function over the long run.31    
 In practice, this liberal perspective on free trade was visible during multilateral 
negotiations, called the Uruguay Round, that formally established the WTO in 1995.  The 
 
30 Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy, pp. 218-220 
31 Douglas A. Irwin, "Retrospectives: Challenges to Free Trade." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, 
no. 2 (1991): 201-08. 
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objective of U.S. trade negotiators during the Uruguay Round was to increase the 
openness of and access to the entire global economy, minimize state intervention in 
markets, and ensure all member states played by the same set of rules.32  Up until the 
2008 crisis, this liberal perspective went largely unchallenged.       
   However, the WTO rules that were established by the Uruguay Round often 
proved ineffective in deterring states from interfering in markets.  Such interventions, if 
they are large enough, can inhibit the functioning of markets and result in distortions like 
large price changes.  Neomercantilists and realists alike argue that states often have the 
incentive to intervene when the market delivers unfavorable change, such that their 
prospect of gains relative to that of a trading partner are diminished.33  For instance, 
during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Asian steel firms flooded the U.S. market with 
steel imports which drove down domestic prices and contributed to significant job loss as 
U.S. firms struggled to compete with cheaper imports amid the glut.  It is therefore in this 
type of situation that the short-comings of portraying free trade as purely Pareto-
improving or positive-sum become apparent.  Under stable conditions, free trade may 
indeed be akin to a positive-sum exchange.  But once a crisis occurs, trade can sometimes 
transform into a zero-sum dynamic for parties with relatively little political power, like 
the domestic steel workers whose unions were unable to secure WTO-facilitated 
compensation in the short-term.34   
 There is a technical term for this type of outcome that the literature rarely 
discusses at length, known as a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in which some people are made 
 
32 Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, pp. 652-654 
33 John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," pp. 21-24 
34 Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, pp. 667-669 
15 
 
better off (the foreign firms) and may be able to compensate those who are made worse 
off (U.S. workers) at some time in the future, however this compensation is not officially 
required.  This type of outcome gives credence to critical theorists who argue that free 
trade creates unfavorable distributions of benefit and harm.35  However, what critical 
theorists often get wrong is that developed capitalist countries can also be harmed by free 
trade with a lower-developed country thanks to a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.   
 Another market-distorting problem that arose after 1995 was that several states 
enacted currency manipulation policies against the U.S. because of the dollar’s central 
role as the global reserve currency.  After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, affected 
countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and China believed that the best way to insulate 
themselves from another liquidity crisis was to increase the total amount of their currency 
reserves.  To do this, they interfered in markets to devalue their currencies against the 
dollar with the objective of creating trade surpluses.36  As a result, Asian exports like 
those in the Chinese manufacturing and consumer electronics sectors became artificially 
cheaper and thus more appealing to international buyers.  U.S. exports to China and 
elsewhere, now more expensive thanks to a stronger dollar, failed to balance the growth 
of the import surge.37   
 The problem for the U.S. in this situation is that the world economy is a closed 
system.  For every dollar of trade surplus within a country’s current account balance 
(trade balance plus net income transactions), that dollar must be offset in at least one 
other country’s trade deficit.  In short, current account balances are fundamentally zero-
 
35 Theodore Cohn, Global Political Economy, pp. 216 
36 C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon. Currency Conflict and Trade Policy: A New Strategy for the 
United States (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2017), pp. 7-10 
37 Douglas Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, pp. 677-679 
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sum.  Moreover, because of the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency, manipulators 
naturally seek to obtain dollars in most cases.  In practice, this meant that the U.S. trade 
deficit was, at a minimum, inflated by these currency distortions.  To offset this 
accounting problem, part of the U.S. response was to encourage foreign capital 
investment that could be listed in its financial account, some of which ended up in the 
housing market.  This foreign investment placed some upward pressure in housing 
demand which helped to raise prices and the overall supply of houses.38  
 Although the neomercantilist perspective appears to have more explanatory power 
with regard to market-distorting practices, liberals are keen to argue that such examples 
are the exception and not the rule.  Specifically, because institutions serve as a forum for 
cooperation and as a common source of information, this gives competing states the 
opportunity to alleviate conditions that lead to concerns about relative gains.39  However, 
as we will see in the data section, the exceptions can be far more consequential than the 
rule under certain circumstances.   
Perspectives on Crisis  
 As it relates to the causes of financial crises, there is not a substantial gulf of 
disagreement between liberals and neomercantilists.  Neomercantilists are often skeptical 
of financial integration with other states, especially when rival states are capable of 
shifting the direction and size of capital flows across borders.40  Along similar lines, 
liberals who favor a greater role for government intervention assert that such intervention 
may be necessary because the international financial system fails to tame the volatility 
 
38 Bergsten and Gagnon, Currency Conflict and Trade Policy, pp. 90-93 
39 Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." International Security 
20, no. 1 (1995): pp. 44-46. doi:10.2307/2539214. 
40 Theodore Cohn, Global Political Economy, pp. 196 
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inherent in currency valuation, which can place states at the mercy of market outcomes.41  
Thus, both schools acknowledge, to a degree, that large and unexpected deviations can 
have a disproportionate outcome on a state’s financial stability. 
 One of the most comprehensive views on the mechanics of financial crisis was 
originally formulated by Hyman Minksy and expanded on by Charles P. Kindleberger 
and Robert Z. Aliber in their 2011 book Manias, Panics, and Crashes.  Starting with 
Minsky’s model, they assert that during periods of high economic growth the supply of 
credit to borrowers (in the aggregate) expands.  As the supply of credit expands, 
borrowers become more risk-tolerant and take out debt to purchase assets like housing or 
stocks.  In this situation, borrowers are betting that asset prices will continue to rise faster 
relative to interest rates, thus creating a profit for them after making their interest 
payments.  However, this behavior is not sustainable over the long-run due to the cyclical 
nature of markets.  In order to stay afloat financially, this means a borrower will have to 
correctly anticipate the timing of market trends.  Minsky hypothesized that market trends 
were the result of “shocks” to the economic system that can cause both booms and busts.  
 In this case, shocks most likely refer to a large re-allocation of resources brought 
about by one or more substantial changes in the economic environment.  For example, the 
internet ushered in rapid growth in information technology industries in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, causing the dot-com bubble.42  Following this logic, sweeping trade 
liberalization policies can also result in shocks because of trade flows and resource re-
 
41 Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1986), pp. 8-14 




allocations.  John Romalis’ research about NAFTA, mentioned previously, partially 
confirms this inference.    
 Kindleberger and Aliber also discuss the consequences of shocks clustering 
together in a short period of time.  They refer to these clusters as waves that contribute to 
an unsustainable expansion of credit which ultimately results in a bubble.  They argue 
that between the 1970s and the 2000s, there have been four distinct international credit 
bubbles and that these waves are not independently occurring phenomenon.  That is, a 
preceding wave exerts some meaningful impact on the creation of a subsequent wave.43  
However, the strength of the relationship between each individual wave is variable.   
 Kindleberger and Aliber’s observation about waves and their impact is not 
unusual in economics.  Polymath Benoit Mandelbrot found similar behavior in financial 
markets, starting with his study of cotton prices in the 1960s.  From his study of cotton, 
Mandelbrot found evidence of what he calls long-term dependence.  Under certain 
circumstances, the prices of the past can exert a strong influence on today’s prices.  In 
contrast, financial theory as it existed before the 2008 crisis believed that inputs to the 
prices of today are independent from those of yesterday: only the present and the future 
matter as inputs.  In other words, Mandelbrot argues that some market behavior like the 
movement of asset prices, even housing prices, adhere to rules of conditional probability.  
That is, the outcome of some future event B is conditional on the outcome of past event 
A.  However, the strength of this influence depends on how far back in time you go and 
how much volatility is clustered together in the past.  As a heuristic, Mandelbrot found 
that a series of large price movements that cluster together closely in time yields a very 
 
43 Ibid, pp. 273 
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strong influence on future prices.  In other words: when it rains, it pours.  For example, 
Mandelbrot cites how Cisco Systems’ unprecedented revenue growth between 1995 and 
2000 fueled a wave of investor speculation that was premised on the belief that such 
growth would continue, which caused a bubble that invariably burst in late 2000.44   
 In short, the chief implication of Kindleberger, Aliber, and Mandelbrot’s work is 
that international market distortions like contemporaneous manipulation of several 
currencies aimed at creating artificial trade surpluses can have an unseen but considerable 
effect on the movement of asset prices in the future.  In turn, this long-term dependence 
helps contribute to the formation of credit bubbles.  
Gaps in the literature 
 In light of long-term dependence and credit waves, neither liberalism nor 
neomercantilism offers a convincing theoretical solution to the static limitations of 
comparative advantage.  Let us recall that because Riccardo’s model is deterministic and 
continuous, random events have no influence on the expectation of trade outcomes, 
which are, in the liberal view, supposed to be Pareto-improving.  Furthermore, calls for 
targeted government intervention as a solution does not fully address how to insure 
against the risks of unforeseen events that arise from trade, like the steel dumping case 
mentioned previously.  Although such dumping is already illegal according to WTO 
rules, that did not deter Asian firms from flouting the rules.  Moreover, such intervention 
into the complex mechanics of the global economy, like actively managing currency rates 
 
44 Benoit Mandelbrot and Richard Hudson, “Long Memory, from the Nile to the Marketplace” in the 
(mis)behavior of Markets, pp. 173-193 
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as scholar Susan Strange suggests45, invites the potential for egregious miscalculations 
due to the non-linear properties of currency rates.46 
  However, in some of the more modern literature about microeconomics, the 
epistemology that supports the liberal position on free trade and confronts this question of 
risk is known as Expected Utility Theory (EUT).  EUT was formalized by John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1947 and posits that decisions under uncertainty can 
be modeled through the use of gambles.47  EUT assumes that rational actors make 
judgments about a set of choices as if they were following a quantitative model that aims 
to find the greatest personal utility according to some individual function.   
 For example, suppose there are two gambles generated by a fair coin flip.  
Gamble 1 yields a gain of $10 or a loss of $1 to your initial level of wealth: $10.  Gamble 
2 yields a $20 gain or a $10 loss.  Choosing between these gambles depends on the 
function used to derive an expectation.  If we assume a convex function (risk-tolerant) 
like 𝑥2, then the expected values are:  
 1: . 5 ∗ (10 + 10)2 +  .5 ∗ (10 − 1)2 = 240.5  
 2: . 5 ∗ (10 + 20)2 +  .5 ∗ (10 − 10)2 = 450 
Gamble 2 thus looks like more appealing.  However, if we use a concave function (risk-
averse) like √𝑥, then Gamble 1 will offer a higher expected payoff.  Given that liberals 
expect a Pareto-improvement for free trade, they can be best characterized as risk-
tolerant.  Neomercantilists, on the other hand are a bit more puzzling due to their 
acknowledgment of free trade as beneficial while also being motivated by relative gains.  
 
45 Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism, pp. 146-151 
46 H.L. Wei and S.A. Billings, “Power-law behaviour evaluation from foreign exchange market data using a 
wavelet transform method,” Physics Letters A 373, no. 37 (2009): 3328. 
47 Robert H. Frank, Microeconomics and Behavior 9th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2015), pp. 180 
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Interestingly, EUT does not account for the possibility of changing one’s preferences like 
neomercantilists sometimes do.  
 Consequently, recent research has shown that this limitation of EUT can lead to 
flawed inferences.  Specifically, the use of linear combinations, in the manner 
demonstrated above, to derive an expected average is not warranted in all circumstances.  
In situations where gambles repeat themselves through time, such as continuous 
international trade, then a stochastic growth process is required.48  A stochastic process 
would model potential changes to risk preferences over time, like the changes in behavior 
that would result from an unbroken winning streak or severe damage brought on by a 
financial crisis.  In other words, the shortcoming of using EUT to understand and manage 
risk is that its assumptions are static, much like Riccardo’s model.   
 The practical problem then in applying EUT to decisions about free trade and 
controlling the risk of financial crisis is that it can blind analysts and decision makers to 
the non-linear behavior of market phenomenon.  That is, EUT provides a sub-optimal 
framework for understanding outlier events, also known was tail events because of their 
location within a statistical distribution.  Accurate measurement of the probability of tail 
events such as an unusually tall person, a large deviation in a country’s trade balance, or 
mortgage default rates reaching a certain level, depends largely on the tools being used.   
 Mandelbrot has shown that for a long time, orthodox economic models were 
using the wrong tools.  Specifically, the Gaussian or normal distribution was relied on to 
make inferences about the risk of tail events.  Similar to the findings of Wei and Billings, 
Mandelbrot argues that many market phenomenon actually follow a power-law 
 




distribution in which tail events are assessed as more likely to occur and also tend to alter 
the properties of the entire distribution.49  To illustrate, if one were to assess, in advance, 
the probability of the earthquake that led to the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan using a 
normal distribution, the odds would be appraised at about once every 13,000 years.  In 
contrast, a power-law distribution model would peg the odds at once every 300 years.50    
 Mandelbrot’s analysis may partially explain the contemporaneous reaction to the 
2008 crisis.  Never before in American history had so many citizens defaulted on their 
mortgages simultaneously.  After all, if one homeowner defaults in Michigan, this surely 
has no impact on homeowners in Florida.  Of course, the existence of a nationwide 
housing bubble is a condition that affects everyone equally.  In calculating the probability 
of such an event happening, the credit rating agencies responsible for appraising the 
quality of all mortgage-backed securities on the market relied on a Gaussian framework 
pioneered by 20th century French mathematician Louis Bachelier.5152  The reason 
Bachelier’s framework was used was because the normal distribution lends itself well to 
statistical inference about probability.  For instance, once a data set contains 
approximately 30 observations, according to the Central Limit Theorem, a stable value 
for the mean and standard deviation emerge.  And from these stable values, probabilities 
of tail events like mortgage default can be inferred.  However, the normal distribution has 
“thin-tails,” which means that the farther away an observation is from the average, its 
probability of occurrence decreases at an accelerating rate.  An event that is 3 standard 
deviations (3-sigma) away from the mean (can be positive or negative) has a probability 
 
49 Benoit Mandelbrot and Richard Hudson, the (mis)behavior of Markets, pp. 147-159 
50 Nate Silver, The Signal and The Noise, pp. 170  
51 Ibid, pp.  26-30 
52 Benoit Mandelbrot and Richard Hudson, the (mis)behavior of Markets, pp. 59-63 
23 
 
of 1 - .9973 = .0027 or 1 in 370.  The probability of a 4-sigma event is 1 in 15,787, which 
is substantially lower odds despite one additional deviation.  
 In contrast, a fat or thick-tailed distribution means that events far away from the 
average have different odds and are far more consequential in determining the 
distribution’s properties.  As a result, the tails of these distributions often convey more 
useful information than the average does. That is, as the tails fatten, inferences that use 
values of the average and standard deviation become increasingly unreliable.53  
Therefore, policy decisions that might rely on expected averages, like the ones derived 
from EUT, are now subjected to substantially greater margins of error in the presence of 
variables that do not conform to the normal distribution.  This marginalization of 
expected averages is similar to what Ole Peters found with regard to EUT.    
Methodology and Hypotheses 
 To operationalize the research question, the independent variable, U.S. trade 
liberalization, will use the monthly U.S. trade balance (total goods and services, balance 
of payment basis) between 1992 and 2009 as a singular representation of aggregated U.S. 
economic activity.  Given that this figure is a component of the U.S. current account and 
is tracked by international institutions, the trade balance can be viewed as a reliable proxy 
that reflects the consequences of trade policy.  However, currency manipulation in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s introduces some noise into the data’s integrity.   
 1992 is the selected start date for two reasons.  First, the U.S. did not fully track 
the trade balance on a monthly basis prior to January 1992.  Furthermore, according to 
U.S. Census data, the monthly trade balance before 1992 only accounted for goods but 
 
53 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails, (Stem Academic Press, 2020), pp. 21-23 
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not services.  Between 1960 and 1991, the trade balance for both goods and services was 
only reported in annual terms.  Therefore, in order to avoid the small sample bias that 
annual figures would introduce, a monthly basis that includes both goods and services 
between 1992 and 2009 will be used as the primary dataset for analysis.  Additionally, in 
order to account for time lag and confounding effects that may have existed prior to 
enactment of the Uruguay Round in 1995, the data series needs to be extended to include 
previous years.  2009 is the cutoff date to also account for time lag effects given that the 
nadir of the crisis occurred in 2008.   
 Despite the technical necessity for using 1992 as the start date for analysis, it is 
important to acknowledge that the trade deficit in January 1992 was much smaller than it 
had been in prior years.  For instance, in 1987, the annual deficit was the highest it had 
ever been at approximately -$151.68 billion, a cumulative total.  Therefore, in order to 
partially account for the effect that these record deficits before 1992 may have had, a 
supplemental regression test will be used on annualized terms between the years of 1975 
and 1995.   
 The dependent variable will be represented by the monthly U.S. Housing Price 
Index (seasonally adjusted) between 1992 and 2009.  The Housing Price Index 
incorporates data from all 50 U.S. states and samples from millions of housing price 
records which partially control for demographic, regional, and intra-state factors.54  In 
other words, the Housing Price Index incorporates data from all manner of housing sales, 
including both subprime and prime classifications, both of which were also bundled 
together in mortgage-backed securities.  The seasonally adjusted metric was used to 
 
54 Federal Housing Finance Agency, “House Price Index,” Federal Housing Finance Agency, Accessed on 
June 21, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index.aspx 
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account for confounding data that may result from a surge in housing turnover common 
to the summer months.  
 The methodology to be used is a linear regression analysis with a 99% confidence 
interval.  This interval is relevant given the distinctions drawn between thin and fat-tailed 
variables in the Literature Review.  By broadening the interval to 99%, this helps to 
account for the impact that outliers might have.  Regression analysis has been selected 
because there is an observable linear pattern between the variables when they are plotted 
together.  Accordingly, regression helps to account for the variation within this linear 
bias.  Consistent with conventional statistical hypothesis testing, the hypotheses are 
separated into the null and alternative hypotheses: 
Null hypothesis: there is no relationship between the U.S. trade deficit and the 
housing bubble. 
 
Alternative hypothesis: there is a relationship (positive or negative) between the U.S. 
trade deficit and the housing bubble.    
 
 Based on the findings of previous research, the expectation is that the null 
hypothesis will be rejected.  However, because U.S. trade policy does not formally direct 
and coordinate the economic decisions of individual actors, it would be inappropriate to 
view evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis as an indication that policy played a 
direct causal role in the formation and subsequent bursting of the housing bubble that 
catalyzed the 2008 crisis.  Rather, a finding in favor of the alternative hypothesis might 
suggest that U.S. trade liberalization was a necessary pre-condition that allowed effects 






Given that this approach relies on a time-series dataset, the results of a simple 
linear regression analysis will be somewhat limited in their applicability.  This is due to 
the fact that the data are continuous and time lag effects are difficult to fully track without 
the use of advanced methods.  To fully control for these issues, more advanced 
techniques like applied econometrics would be required, which is beyond the scope of 
this study.  
Data 
 The independent variable between January 1992 and December 2009 is illustrated 
graphically below by Figure 1.  Grey shaded areas in the graph indicate endogenous U.S. 
recessions.  The first one began in March 2001 after the bursting of the dot-com bubble 












Figure 1: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau, Trade Balance: Goods and Services, Balance of 
Payments Basis, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOPGSTB, June 5, 2020. 
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The dependent variable between January 1992 and December 2009 is illustrated  
graphically below by Figure 2.  The base Index score is 100 which implies no overall 




























 Next, to account for the large deficits that existed before 1992, a regression 
analysis which uses annualized data from 1975 and 1995 (n=21) will be conducted and is 
reflected below in Figure 4.  Since this study is measuring the impact of the Uruguay 
Round and the PNTR which both came into effect after January 1, 1995, the data has 
been extended to include all of 1995 to account for time-lag effects.  However, it must be 
noted that using annualized data instead of monthly data risks the introduction of a small 
sample bias. 
 The data for the explanatory variable is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
Economic Indicator Division and reflects the U.S. trade balance in goods and services on 
a Balance of Payments basis in annual terms.  The data for the response variable is also 
sourced from the Federal Housing Finance Agency and uses the All-Transactions House 
Price Index for the United States which is not seasonally adjusted and does not account 
for more granular variables like the current Housing Index does.  However, the current 
Housing Index did not start incorporating data until January 1991.  Additionally, the All-
Transactions Index is pegged relative to prices in January 1980, which serves as the basis 








Adjusted R Square 0.936592223
Standard Error 10.53924568
Observations 216
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 97.33020474 1.250355817 77.84200581 5.8252E-159

















Given the regression data in Figure 3 and Figure 4, and the 99% cutoff interval 
where p must be greater or equal to .01, there appears to be sufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis in both Figures 3 and 4.   
 Building off of the discussion between thin and fat-tailed variables, the next series 
of tests will help establish the degree of volatility exhibited in the independent variable.  
Since trade deficits need to be offset in the financial account, a high level of volatility in 
the current account can result in an excess demand for foreign capital investment than 
there otherwise would be in periods of greater stability. To help measure this volatility, a 
kurtosis test can be used to establish the significance of large deviations in the 
Figure 4: Regression Analysis of U.S. Trade Deficit and All-Transactions Index 1975-1995.   
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 99.50314772 12.06308538 8.248565319 1.06073E-07
X Variable 1 -0.00049585 0.000152899 -3.243016337 0.004280366
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independent variable.  A normal distribution has a kurtosis value of 3.0.  Distributions 
with kurtosis values less than 3 have thinner tails and distributions with a value greater 
than 3 have thicker tails.   
 Using the kurtosis test in MS Excel and accounting for its adjustment of -3.0 basis 
points, the monthly U.S. trade balance between 1992 and 2009 reflected in Figure 1 has a 
kurtosis of 1.685 which indicates very thin tails.  This implies that large deviations from 
the average are even less consequential than in a normal distribution.  However, it is clear 
from looking at Figure 1 that there are huge jumps in the curve, especially in 2008.  
Moreover, the 2008 crisis caused significant damage as mentioned previously, so this 
kurtosis test is inconclusive and creates a puzzle.   
 However, if the kurtosis test is changed to track the change in trade volume 
between months, then this may better capture trends in volatility, instead of relying on the 
nominal, end-of-period values that Figure 1 depicts.  Using this metric, displayed below 
in Figure 5, and measuring kurtosis, we get a value of 11.15 which tells us that there are 
very large deviations taking place within the U.S. current account on a monthly basis.  
For example, the average monthly change in the deficit between June 1994 and June 
1998 was -$112.63 million per month.  Between July 1998 and July 2002, the average 
change had almost quadrupled to -$415.92 million per month.  After the nadir of the 
crisis had passed the U.S. in late 2008, the trade deficit began to swing wildly, likely as a 




















 Additionally, Mandelbrot advises that there is another way to test if a variable is 
becoming more or less volatile.  By examining the behavior of its second central 
statistical moment, the variance, we can get an idea of how dispersed the data are.55  
According to the Central Limit Theorem, after about 30 observations the mean, variance, 
and standard deviation should start to converge to a stable value.  That is, the inclusion of 
one additional observation should not cause these values to change significantly.  But 
looking at the variance of the trade balance in Figure 6 below, it is clear that between 
June 1994 and June 1998 the variance did initially converge to and remain at a stable 
value of approximately $5.7 trillion.  After June 1998, however, the variance begins to 
grow rapidly despite the supposed stabilizing effect of 84 prior observations.  
 
55 Benoit Mandelbrot and Richard Hudson, the (mis)behavior of Markets, pp. 95 
Figure 5: Measures the change from each previous month.    
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Furthermore, the variance peaks at $472.35 trillion in October 2008 with 173 prior 
observations.  With the addition of just 14 additional data points (November 2008 thru 
December 2009), the variance again changes considerably to $445.2 trillion, a decrease 
of -5.75%.   
 The purpose of the kurtosis and variance tests are meant to show that trade 
liberalization was not reducing volatility as the narrative of the Great Moderation would 

















Figure 6: Beginning with 30 observations in June 1994, each additional month is added to the calculation 




 At first glance, the finding of a strong relationship between the trade deficit and 
rising housing prices between 1992 and 2009 is not surprising.  After all, a trade deficit 
that dominates a state’s current account must be offset in its financial account, which the 
literature tells us invites foreign investment and often flows into “safe” assets like 
housing.  This relationship between rising trade deficits and housing prices also appears 
to be present between 1975 and 1995, however the strength of the relationship during this 
time, R^2 = .356, is significantly weaker than it would become after 1995, R^2 = .937.   
 This strong result after 1995 may be partially explained by two observations.  
First, the variance and kurtosis tests of Figure 5 and 6 respectively provides some 
evidence that the trade deficit between 1992 and 2009 behaved more like a fat-tailed 
variable than a normal one.  That is, there was a high level of volatility within the trade 
balance that had to necessarily be offset in the U.S.’ financial account.  Second, the work 
of Kindleberger, Aliber, and Mandelbrot advises us that when such volatility clusters 
together, it can cause large changes in market functionality, in this case the movement of 
housing prices, across long periods of time.  This volatility likely accelerated from the 
Asian and Russian Financial Crises in 1997 and 1998 respectively, which introduced a 
period of currency manipulation against the dollar and also reflects a preference on the 
part of international investors to invest capital and provide exports to the United States as 
a tactic to avoid the pain of internal adjustment.   
 To offset this volatility in its financial account, the U.S. opened itself to foreign 
investment, thanks to low interest rates and the removal of barriers like Trade-related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) after 1995, which would have made it costlier for foreign 
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firms to invest in the U.S.  Housing was a likely destination for foreign capital flows 
because, aside from U.S. Treasury Bonds, it was deemed safe because risks were 
assumed to be largely uncorrelated.  In 2005, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan remarked that housing bubbles were local and therefore not a national issue.56  
After the crisis had passed and housing prices had returned to normal, currency 
manipulation had been corrected, and regulation was introduced to change the behavior 
of U.S. financial institutions, excess capital and debt concentration in the housing sector 
was subsequently discouraged.   
 Since U.S. policy remained fairly consistent in terms of pursuing free trade since 
1992 and before the 2008 crisis, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
in favor of the alternative.  Even though the nominal value of the trade deficit is just a 
snapshot of the market’s total activity at a specific point of time, the high level of 
volatility during this time likely would not have been possible if the Uruguay Round and 
the PNTR did not remove barriers like TRIMs that had previously moderated large 
changes in trade flows.  
 But in spite of a strong statistical relationship between the deficit and the housing 
bubble, U.S. trade policy after the end of the Cold War cannot be viewed as a causal 
factor in the rise of housing prices.  Instead, it is more appropriate to view trade 
liberalization as an antecedent condition whose absence of unilateral mechanisms to deter 
market-distorting practices encouraged foreign governments to shift financial risk onto 
the United States.  In part, this was because of the dollar’s central role as the global 
 





reserve currency and prevailing perceptions that U.S. markets, particularly housing, were 
highly profitable relative to their risks.  Therefore, in answering the research question, it 
is likely that any contribution trade liberalization had with regard to the 2008 crisis was 
both indirect and subtle.  However, determining the precise strength of this influence is 
beyond the capacity of this study and would require an in-depth treatment of the behavior 
of international firms both before and after the post-Cold War FTAs came into force.   
Conclusion 
 In terms of risk management, the problem with the two major FTAs after the end 
of the Cold War is not that free trade as such is too risky.  Instead, it was the timing and 
sequence of these deals that mattered.  In particular, the multilateral WTO negotiations in 
1995 and the PNTR with China in 2000 uniquely positioned some countries afflicted by 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to shift risk onto the U.S.  Specifically, the WTO 
negotiations discouraged states from taking quick unilateral action against market 
intervention in favor of a lengthy arbitration process.  However, in the aftermath of the 
1997 crisis, states like China faced a choice: they could follow WTO rules and absorb the 
damage or try and mitigate it by increasing currency reserves through an artificial trade 
surplus.  The latter option required the U.S. to bear the fiscal burden of providing dollars 
through increased import purchases.  In response to this artificial imbalance, the U.S. 
choose to open itself to foreign investment.  
 Furthermore, large resource re-allocations that occur quickly can cause long-
lasting economic problems.  As the example of the steel dumping case in the literature 
review relates, an unexpected supply glut caused serious domestic labor displacement.  
Other sectors like manufacturing and consumer electronics were also deeply impacted by 
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a Chinese export surge.  And of course, high levels of capital concentration in the 
housing sector increased the risk of a price collapse.     
 The global economy is a complex system in which countless variables interact on 
a daily basis.  Chance and volatility are intractable and inherent to economic activity.  
Nonetheless, free trade remains a dominant theme among economic liberals who argue 
that individual actors operating under a set of common rules with few barriers and guided 
by self-interest will produce optimal results most of the time.  However, this study has 
helped to show how globalization, as it occurred after the Cold War, resulted in 
unexpected transfers of risk that were made possible by permissive trade policy.   
 The principal implication of this study is that state leaders should exercise caution 
about making sweeping changes with respect to multilateral or even regional trade 
agreements.  In particular, FTAs that are negotiated within one or two years of a previous 
international financial crisis is a risky prospect because of the increased likelihood that a 
potential trade partner will elect to avoid internal adjustment, driven by relative gains 
logic.  However, state leaders who are committed to trade liberalization could adopt three 
risk mitigation tactics.  
 First, because of the existence of long-term dependence, trade agreements could 
adopt a phased approach to reduce the risk of large resource re-allocations disrupting 
markets.  Second, building in unilateral countermeasures into agreements, like currency 
exchange provisions, can enhance a state’s ability to respond to market interventions.  
However, since most states are member states in the WTO, unilateral mechanisms outside 
of WTO rules may prove difficult to implement or might create compliance costs if WTO 
rules are intentionally circumvented.  But in some cases, the United States’ unique 
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position within both the WTO and IMF may serve as an advantage in offsetting some of 
these compliance costs.  Finally, a third option could be to adjust a state’s fiscal and 
monetary policy in proportion and in response to market distortions in the short-term, 
such as interest rate adjustments or temporary and selective subsidies to offset injury in 
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